of goods involved in collective action and of the institutions that can be used to provide, produce and allocate these goods.
Samuelson versus Musgrave
Olson's initial classi®cation of goods was affected by a debate between Paul Samuelson and Richard Musgrave over the classi®cation of goods and the need for non-market institutions to provide one kind of`public' good. Samuelson (1954) started the debate by using one attribute ± jointness of consumption ± to divide all goods into two classes: private consumption goods and public consumption goods. Samuelson assumed that private consumption goods could be divided and allocated to different consumers but that collective consumption goods are those that`all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good' (Samuelson, 1954: 387) . While market catallactics would allow rational egoists to pursue narrow self-interest and yet produce socially optimal provision of private consumption goods, Samuelson argued that decentralized spontaneous solutions could not work to provide an optimal level of collective consumption goods. In 1959, Richard Musgrave argued that a different attribute of goods ± whether or not someone can be excluded from bene®ting once the good is produced ± is more important than jointness of supply. Musgrave then asserted that the exclusion principle can be used by itself to divide the world into private and public goods. The classi®cation debate was associated with a major policy concern over the role of government in allocating resources.
Both Samuelson and Musgrave were interested in the same question. Each posited a single criterion that would enable them to predict when markets would perform optimally and when markets would fail. The difference in their approach is illustrated in Figure 1 . Samuelson uses his classi®cation to argue that all of the left-hand column and none of the right-hand column include goods that can be effectively allocated through market mechanisms. Musgrave uses his classi®cation to argue that all of the top row and none of the bottom row include goods that are best allocated through the market.
Olson explicitly adopted Musgrave's de®nition. Using this onedimensional criterion, Olson then tried to establish a general theory for all goods meeting Musgrave's de®nition. It was a grand vision but overly ambitious. Multiple scholars have shown that several of his propositions do not hold for all goods meeting the Musgrave de®nition even though these same propositions do hold for a subset of goods for which exclusion is problematic (Chamberlin, 1974; Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977; Hardin, 1982; Dougherty, 240 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15(3) 2002). Obviously, Olson shared both Samuelson's and Musgrave's hope of developing a general theory.
Multiple Types of Collective Action Problems

Exclusion as the Key Attribute of all Collective Action Problems
Olson had a profound insight when he adopted Musgrave's criterion as the de®ning attribute for collective action problems. The name he used to characterize these problems ± public goods ± has appropriately come to be used for a subset of collective action problems rather than the universal set. Public goods are those collective action problems identi®ed as Cell D of Figure 1 where consumption by one person does not reduce the amount available to others. Cell C has come to be known as representing a set of collective action problems that are called common-pool resources (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977; Ostrom et al., 1994) . While Musgrave and Olson tended to assume that exclusion was impossible for a subset of all goods, more recent theoretical work has understood that the capacity to exclude potential bene®ciaries depends both on the technology of physical exclusion devices, such as barbed wire fences and electronic sensing devices, as well as the existence and enforcement of various bundles of property rights (Cornes and Sandler, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1994) . Thus, as discussed later, many people facing collective action problems in the ®eld have changed the structure of the problem they face by building walls (the walled cities of medieval times were, after all, a way of excluding outsiders from the defenses of the city) or creating property rights (inshore ®shers have long used customary law to enforce locally devised rules as to who was allowed to ®sh) (Acheson and Brewer, 2003; Hanna, 2003) .
Consequently, all collective action problems share the problem that excluding non-contributors to a collective bene®t is non-trivial. Collective action problems differ in regard to how costly or dif®cult it is to devise physical or institutional means to exclude others. Some of these differences
OSTROM: TYPES OF GOODS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 241
Samuelson's Classi®cation
Musgrave's Classi®cation One person's consumption One person's consumption subtracts from total available does not subtract from total to others available to others stem from the biophysical world itself. It will always be more dif®cult to exclude users from an ocean or other global commons than from a farmer's pond (Sandler, 1997 (Sandler, , 1998 . The next conundrum to be resolved is whether one theory can explain all patterns and outcomes for collective action problems, as Olson hoped, or whether a family of closely related theories is needed. After more than 30 years of unsuccessful efforts to build one explanatory theory for all collective action problems and multiple insightful critiques of these efforts, I will argue strongly that further efforts to build a single general theory are counterproductive.
Subtractability
Olson actually started the task of building subtheories. He himself classi®ed what he called public goods into exclusive and inclusive public goods and made radically different predictions for the two subclasses. His`exclusive public good' is Cell C. Here, Olson expected groups to try to keep their size as small as possible, to try to get 100 percent participation since`even one non-participant can usually take all of the bene®ts brought about by the action of [others] for himself ' (Olson, 1965: 41) . In the ®eld, groups using a common-pool resource who have found ways to reduce overappropriation frequently try to limit members, as Olson predicted, through clear and enforced boundary rules specifying exactly who can use the resource (Stern et al., 2002 ).
Olson's inclusive groups, in contrast, will try to increase members. The more members there are in an inclusive group, the more individuals there will be who will share the costs of providing a good to all bene®ciaries. In this setting, increasing the number of participants frequently brings additional resources that could be drawn on to provide a bene®t that will be jointly enjoyed by all. It is because of the additional resources available in a larger group and the non-subtractability characteristic of public goods that Marwell and Oliver (1993: 45) conclude that when`a good has pure jointness of supply, group size has a positive effect on the probability that it will be provided'. For example, the level of resources provided to support public radio is greater when a larger population can be called upon than for a small one. Olson also predicts that bargaining and strategic interactions will be less intense in an inclusive group than in an exclusive one.
Not all of the differences predicted by Olson have been tested but laboratory experiments provide clear evidence that common-pool resources and public goods are not only theoretically different types of goods but behavior in situations related to provision of one or the other type of good is substantially different . In a public good setting, non-242 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15(3) cooperative actions by one individual do not make a dramatic difference for others. In ®nitely repeated, public goods experiments, the typical pattern is for subjects on average to contribute about 50 percent of the optimal level in the ®rst round and then follow a pulsing decay pattern downward toward but never reaching the symmetric Nash equilibrium in the last rounds. In common-pool-resource problems, however, the typical pattern is just the opposite. In a common-pool-resource experiment, one person's aggressive withdrawals can generate very high costs for everyone else. In the initial rounds, subjects do much worse than Nash and then pulse upward toward the symmetric Nash equilibrium from below.
In addition to differences among collective action problems in regard to whether consumption is subtractive or not, many other characteristics affect the type of problems that people face in the ®eld. In regard to common-pool resources, for example, Schlager et al. (1994) identify whether the products to be appropriated are mobile like ®sh or stationary like trees. Such attributes affect the costs of learning about the yield of a resource. Similarly, whether there is storage in the system affects the predictability of resource unit availability. When conducting ®eld research, these attributes have strong impacts on the likelihood of successful collective action and the form that collective action takes (see Blomquist, 1992; Tang, 1992; Schlager, 1994; Lam, 1998) . Instead of trying to identify the myriad of speci®c factors that are potentially important in the context of any well-designed ®eldwork, however, I will discuss two abstract forms of representing some of these important differences ± the type of production and appropriation functions that characterize a particular problem. In a later section, I will focus on how further attributes of a common-pool resource may affect the feasibility of diverse types of property regimes.
Production Functions
It is well understood that the production functions for producing private goods take on many shapes and forms. The same is true of public goods and common-pool resources. The most frequently assumed production function is linear. In a linear public goods game, there are N identical players who are each assigned an endowment, E. Each player, I, must then decide between keeping the endowment or contributing some part of the endowment xi i to the production of a public good, G. A production function that determines the total amount of the public good, TG, is:
In the linear public good game, P signi®es the marginal production externality created by contribution to the public good (Isaac and Walker, 1988) .
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If P is 0.25, for example, each person who contributes $1.00 generates a public good of $0.25 for everyone in the game. If four people contribute $1.00 each, the total return just equals the total cost. In this instance, the minimum number of individuals contributing $1.00, where bene®ts exceed costs, or k, would be ®ve (see Frohlich and Oppenheimer [1996] for a clear analysis of when universal contributions is best for the group). The production function that relates individual actions to group outcomes may take any of a wide diversity of forms as shown within a short time of the publication of Olson's book by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1970) , Schelling (1973) and Oppenheimer et al. (1975) . The yield functions for common-pool resources have been represented since the seminal article of Scott Gordon (1954) as a quadratic function. Too many`contributions', rather than too few, is the problem to overcome in a common-pool resource dilemma. As shown in Figure 2 , Marwell and Oliver (1993) provide a synthesis of this work and focus on several other non-linear production functions (including general third-order functions (3c), concave (3e) and convex (3f )) that are characteristic of different types of production functions.
Marwell and Oliver analyzed a variety of monotonically increasing, nonlinear production functions relating individual contributions and the total bene®ts produced and distinguish between production functions that are concave and those that are convex (decelerating and accelerating in their words). In the concave case, while every contribution increases the total bene®ts that a group receives, marginal returns decrease as more and more individuals contribute.
1 When contributions are made sequentially, the initial contributions have far more impact than later contributions. With a convex production function, initial contributions make small increments and later contributions yield progressively greater marginal bene®ts. Convex production functions`are characterized by positive interdependence: each contribution makes the next one more worthwhile and, thus, more likely' (Marwell and Oliver, 1993: 63) .
Settings where mass actions are needed in order to gain a positive response involve convex functions.
2 Their theoretical predictions concerning the success of collective action depend sensitively on the particular shape of 244 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15 (3) 1. The example they use to illustrate such a production function is calling about a pothole in a neighborhood where a city administration is sensitive to citizen support (Marwell and Oliver, 1993: 62) . The ®rst call brings the pothole to the attention of city of®cials and puts it on the list of things to be repaired (raising the probability of repair from zero to perhaps .4 or higher). The second call increases the probability of repair still further, but not as much as the ®rst call. Later calls continue to increase the probability but with a smaller and smaller increment.
2. A strike involving only a few workers is unlikely to produce the level of bene®ts yielded by a strike involving a very large proportion of the workers of a ®rm or in an industry. the production function, on heterogeneity of wealth, on the sequence in which individuals contribute and on the information generated by each action. Thus, they depend on the type of production function to predict behavior and outcomes as well as other variables. To predict when these types of goods will be produced, one needs to analyze how a con®guration of variables operates together ± or how the effect of one set of variables depends upon other variables. Source: Modi®ed from Marwell and Oliver (1993: 59) .
Step-level functions (3b) have also been of considerable interest to scholars of collective action 3 and demonstrate how a subtle difference in the production function of a collective good can make an immense difference in behavior and outcomes. In a step-level production function, actions by up to k participants make no difference in the outcomes obtained but actions by k or more participants discontinuously shift the bene®t upward.
4 Russell Hardin (1976) was among the ®rst to argue that when the shape of the production function for a public good was a step function, solving social dilemmas could be facilitated since no good would be provided if participants did not gain suf®cient inputs to equal or exceed the provision point (k). Until the bene®t is actually produced, it is impossible to`free ride' on the contribution of others. In these settings, individuals may assume that their participation is critical to the provision of the good. This type of production function creates an`assurance problem' rather than a strict social dilemma. For those who perceive their contribution as critical, not contributing is no longer the unique Nash equilibrium.
In a series of public good experiments, John Orbell, Robin Dawes and colleagues used various institutional arrangements to create a discrete provision point or a step level function. All of these experiments had seven participants who were given a promissory note for $5.00 at the beginning of the experiment. Subjects were told that if a minimal contributing set (or k) ± either three or ®ve ± contributed their promissory note, all subjects would receive $10.00 including those who had not contributed. With less than the required number of contributions, no good would be provided. In a series of baseline experiments, subjects were not allowed to communicate and were told only the size of the minimal contributing set needed to obtain the public good. The level of cooperation in these one-shot games without communication is much higher than the zero level predicted. The public good was provided in seven out of ten of the experiments where the minimal contributing set equaled three (50 percent of the individuals contributed) and in four out of ten of the experiments with a minimal contributing set of ®ve (64 percent of the individuals contributed) (van de Kragt et al., 1983) . 246 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15 (3) 3.
Step-level functions are, however, not strictly social dilemmas when there is complete information about the exact shape of the function. When individuals perceive themselves as critical to the achievement of a collective good, the game becomes a coordination game rather than a social dilemma.
4.
Step functions characterize facilities such as bridges, tunnels and roads that have little value if not completed. Some scholars have argued that many public goods are characterized by provision points (Taylor and Ward, 1982; Hampton, 1987; Taylor, 1987) .
Allocation Functions
In formal analyses of collective action, less attention has been paid to allocation functions since it is frequently assumed to be available to all in a group whether or not they have contributed. In any effort to understand multiple types of collective action problems it is also important to include analysis of the function that assigns individuals a share of the total bene®ts or the total costs. Thus, the utility to an individual is the result of the operation of a production function, P, as well as an allocation function, A.
where U i is the utility of the i th person, E is the individual endowment or assets and x i is the amount contributed. The allocation function can initially represent the`natural' allocation in a base game without property rights. Or, to explain behavior in ®eld settings, one needs to understand how property rights and other allocation rules affect the distribution of bene®ts and costs to participants.
In a non-divisible good, each person would receive TG. For universal public goods, such as peace and stability, each individual bene®ts in a similar manner without subtraction from the existence of these states of affairs. In a common-pool resource game, A can be operationalized as x i =Ex i or as a proportionate share of the total based on the rates of contribution levels. A host of allocation functions are actually found in ®eld settings including allocation according to (1) the value of assets held (the function that Olson used); (2) seniority of claims; and (3) spatial or temporal formula. Sandler (1998) stresses that underlying aggregation`technologies' vary in the degree to which they are supportive of collective action.
Allocation formulas can also make each person in a group, or a designated minimal contributing group, feel that their contribution is critical (van de Kragt et al., 1983) . By agreeing that each person will contribute a set proportion of what is believed to be the total cost of obtaining a good, the individuals in such a minimal contributing set face a choice between not contributing and receiving nothing or contributing and receiving the bene®t (assuming others in the minimal contributing set also contribute). The game has been transformed from a social dilemma into an assurance game.
For example, communication enabled participants in the one-shot provision-point public good game, described more fully earlier, to arrive at an allocation formula (van de Kragt et al., 1983) . In all 12 communication experiments, subjects used the opportunity for discussion to decide exactly who would or would not be expected to contribute to the public good. Some groups used lotteries and others relied on simple volunteering. In one case, they encouraged those subjects, who had a higher need for the OSTROM: TYPES OF GOODS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 247 additional $5.00 associated with non-contribution, to identify themselves. In 10 of these 12 experiments, the discussion led to a decision designating the optimal number of participants to be contributors. In all 10 cases, those designated did contribute even though their decision was anonymous. In the other two experiments, the discussion led to the identi®cation of a group of contributors larger than necessary. The authors attribute the high level of success in these communication experiments (as contrasted to moderate levels in their base of experiments described earlier) to the sense of criticalness that participants gained when a minimal contributing set was actually designated through their discussion period. Here the allocation formula made a substantial difference in the outcome achieved. Marks and Croson (1998) examine alternative rebate rules in the provision of a step-level public good. They ®nd that contributions to the provision of the good are signi®cantly higher under a`utilization rebate' rule than under two other rules examined. Using this rule, contributions that are made above those necessary to meet the provision point of the public good are devoted to provide more of a similar public good but one that has a continuous production function. If the original good were an infrastructure, for example, the additional funds could be used to plant trees around the infrastructure. In this setting, what one contributes to the provision of the step-level infrastructure can be allocated to the continuous`environmental' public good. In their experiments, Marks and Croson (1998) ®nd that contributions were signi®-cantly higher in those experiments with a utilization rebate rule than in those experiments where no rebate was made for over-contributions or where the rebate was re-distributed to contributors on a proportional basis. Using the latter two allocation functions, contributions were very close to the de®cient Nash equilibrium for the game.
Common-pool Resources and Diverse Property Regimes
The key argument being made in this article is that attributes of the goods produced and allocated, as well as the rules used for their production and allocation, affect the diverse incentives that participants face. The ®rst attribute that scholars should examine is whether excluding bene®ciaries requires high costs or only low costs. If exclusion is costly, potential bene®ciaries face a collective action problem. Second, one needs to determine whether consumption is subtractive or not. Potential bene®ciaries whose consumption is subtractive face a common-pool resource type of collective action problem. Further distinctions are needed to get full theoretical leverage on how diverse property-rights regimes are likely to perform and be used (Aggarwal and Dupont, 1999) . 248 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15 (3) Several confusions, besides those related to the core de®nitions of a public good and a common-pool resource, have led to misunderstandings in academic and policy debates. The term`common-property resource', for example, is frequently used to describe the type of economic good with high exclusion costs and where one person's consumption subtracts from the total ± or a`common-pool resource'. Recognizing a class of goods that share these two attributes enables scholars to identify core theoretical problems. Using property in the term used to refer to a type of good reinforces the impression that goods sharing these attributes tend everywhere to be produced and allocated through the same property regime.
Common-pool resources may be owned by national, regional or local governments, by communal groups or by private individuals or corporations. When they are owned by no one or paradoxically by`everyone', they are used as open access resources by whomever can gain access. The confusion between common property and open access is rampant.
Each of the broad types of property regimes has different sets of advantages and disadvantages but at times may rely upon similar operational rules regarding access and use of a resource (Feeny et al., 1990) . Examples exist of both successful and unsuccessful efforts to govern and manage common-pool resources by governments, communal groups, cooperatives, voluntary associations and private individuals or ®rms (Bromley et al., 1992; Singh, 1994; Singh and Ballabh, 1996) . Thus, common-pool resources are not automatically associated with common-property regimes ± or with any other particular type of property regime.
A property right is an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in a speci®c domain (Commons, 1968) .
5 Property rights de®ne actions that individuals can take in relation to other individuals regarding some`thing'. If one individual has a right, someone else has a commensurate duty to observe that right. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify ®ve property rights that are most relevant for the use of common-pool resources, including access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. These are de®ned as follows.
Access: the right to enter a de®ned physical area and enjoy non-subtractive bene®ts (e.g. hike, canoe, sit in the sun). Withdrawal: the right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system (e.g. catch ®sh, divert water). Management: the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements. Exclusion: the right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be transferred.
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5. This section draws on Ostrom and Schlager (1996) .
Alienation: the right to sell or lease exclusion, management or withdrawal rights.
In much of the economics literature, private property is de®ned as equivalent to the right of alienation. Property-rights systems that do not contain the right of alienation are frequently considered to be ill de®ned. Further, they are presumed to lead to inef®ciency since property-rights holders cannot trade their interest in an improved resource system for other goods or money nor can someone who has a more ef®cient use of a resource system purchase that system in whole or in part (Demsetz, 1967) . Property-rights systems that include the right to alienation are to be most ef®cient because it is assumed that rights to their use will be transferred to those who will allocate them to their highest valued use. Larson and Bromley (1990) challenge this commonly held view and show that much more information must be known about the speci®c values of a large number of parameters before judgements can be made concerning the ef®ciency of a particular type of property right. Instead of focusing on only one right, it is far more useful to de®ne ®ve classes of property-rights holders as shown in Table 1 . In this view, individuals or collectivities may hold well-de®ned property rights that include or do not include all ®ve of the rights de®ned earlier. This approach separates the question of whether a particular right is well de®ned from the question of the effect of having a particular set of rights.`Authorized entrants' include most recreational users of national parks who purchase an operational right to enter and enjoy the natural beauty of the park but do not have a right to harvest forest products.
Those who have both entry and withdrawal use-right units are`authorized users'. The presence or absence of constraints upon the timing, technology used, purpose of use and quantity of resource units harvested are determined by operational rules devised by those holding the collective-choice rights (or authority) of management and exclusion. The operational rights of entry and use may be ®nely divided into quite speci®c`tenure niches' (Bruce, 1995) that vary by season, by use, by technology and by space. Tenure niches may overlap when one set of users owns the right to harvest fruits from trees, another set of users owns the right to the timber in these trees and the trees may be located on land owned by still others (Bruce et al., 1993) . Operational rules may allow authorized users to transfer access and withdrawal rights either temporarily through a rental agreement or permanently when these rights are assigned or sold to others (see Adasiak [1979] for a description of the rights of authorized users of the Alaskan salmon and herring ®sheries).
Claimants' possess the operational rights of access and withdrawal plus a collective-choice right of managing a resource that includes decisions concerning the construction and maintenance of facilities and the authority to 250 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15(3) devise limits on withdrawal rights. The net ®shers of Jambudwip, India, for example, annually regulate the positioning of nets so as to avoid interference but do not have the right to determine who may ®sh along the coast (Raychaudhuri, 1980) . Farmers on large-scale government-owned irrigation systems frequently devise rotation schemes for allocating water on a branch canal (Shivakoti and Ostrom, 2002) . Local groups who obtain hunting rights assigned by a government agency frequently have rights as claimants (Gibson, 1999) as do ®sheries assigned transferable quotes by a government agency (see EythoÂ rsson, 2003) . Proprietors' hold the same rights as claimants with the addition of the right to determine who may access and harvest from a resource. Most of the property systems that are called`common-property' regimes involve participants who are proprietors and have four of the previously described rights but do not possess the right to sell their management and exclusion rights even though they most frequently have the right to bequeath it to members of their family (see Bromley et al., 1992; Acheson and Brewer, 2003; Hanna, 2003) .
Empirical studies have found that some proprietors have suf®cient rights to make decisions that promote long-term investment and harvesting from a resource. Place and Hazell (1993) conducted surveys in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda to ascertain if indigenous land-right systems were a constraint on agricultural productivity. They found that having the rights of a proprietor as contrasted to an owner in these settings did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Other studies conducted in Africa (MigotAdholla et al., 1991; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994 ) also found little difference in productivity, investment levels or access to credit. In densely settled regions, however, proprietorship over agricultural land may not be suf®cient (Feder et al., 1988; Feder and Feeny, 1991) . In a series of studies of inshore ®sheries, self-organized irrigation systems, forest user groups and groundwater institutions, proprietors tended to develop strict boundary rules to exclude non-contributors; established authority rules to allocate withdrawal OSTROM: TYPES OF GOODS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 251 
Source: Ostrom and Schlager (1996: 133). rights; devised methods for monitoring conformance; and used graduated sanctions against those who did not conform to these rules (Blomquist, 1992; Agrawal, 1994; Schlager, 1994; Lam, 1998; . Full owners' possess the right of alienation ± the right to transfer a good in any way the owner wishes that does not harm the physical attributes or uses of other owners ± in addition to the bundle of rights held by a proprietor. An individual, a private corporation, a government or a communal group may possess full ownership rights to any kind of good including a commonpool resource (Dahl and Lindblom, 1963; Montias, 1976) . The rights of full owners, however, are never absolute. Even private owners have responsibilities not to generate particular kinds of harms for others (Demsetz, 1967) . Partial owners may possess the right of alienation to one or more of the other rights but not the full set.
What should be obvious by now is that the world of property rights is far more complex than simply government, private and common property. These terms better re¯ect the status and organization of the holder of a particular right than the bundle of property rights held. All of the rights described here can be held by single individuals or by collectivities. Some communal ®shing systems grant their members all ®ve of these rights, including the right of alienation (Miller, 1989) . Members in these communal ®shing systems have full ownership rights. Similarly, farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal, the Philippines and Spain have established transferable shares to the systems. Access, withdrawal, voting and maintenance responsibilities are allocated by the amount of shares owned (Siy, 1982; Maass and Anderson, 1986; Martin and Yoder, 1983a,b,c; Martin, 1986) . However, some proposals to`privatize' inshore ®sheries through the device of an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), allocate transferable use rights to authorized ®shers but do not allocate rights related to the management of the ®sheries, the determination of who is a participant nor the transfer of management and exclusion rights (see, for example, Yandle and Dewees, 2003) . Thus, proposals to establish ITQ systems, which are frequently referred to as forms of`privatization', do not involve full ownership but rather a form of partial ownership (Rose, 2002; Tietenberg, 2002) .
Attributes of Common-pool Resources Conducive to the Use of Communal Property Rights
Given the diversity of property-right systems that can be utilized, an important question is why do users of common-pool resources elect to use a communal property system or a private-property system? What are the attributes 252 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15 (3) of common-pool resources that are conducive to communal proprietorship or communal ownership as contrasted to individual ownership? Groups of individuals are considered to share communal property rights when they have formed an organization that exercises at least the collective-choice rights of management and exclusion in relationship to some de®ned resource system and the resource units produced by that system. Communal groups most frequently establish some means of governing themselves in relationship to a resource (Ostrom, 1990) . Where communal groups are full owners, members of the group have the further right to sell their access, use, exclusion and management rights to others, subject in many systems to approval by other members of the group. Some communal proprietorships are formally organized and recognized by legal authorities as having a corporate existence. Other communal proprietorships are less formally organized and may exercise de facto property rights that may or may not be supported by legal authorities if challenged by non-members (see Ghate, 2000) . Obviously, such groups hold less well-de®ned bundles of property rights than those who are secure in their de jure rights even though the latter may not hold the complete set of property rights de®ned as full ownership. In other words, well-de®ned and secure property rights may not involve the right to alienation. Even though all common-pool resources share the dif®culty of devising methods to achieve exclusion and the subtractability of resource units, the variability of common-pool resources is immense in regard to other attributes that affect the incentives of resource users and the likelihood of achieving outcomes that approach optimality. Further, whether it is dif®cult or costly to develop physical or institutional means to exclude non-bene®ciaries depends both on the availability and cost of technical and institutional solutions to the problem of exclusion and the relationship of the cost of these solutions to the expected bene®ts of achieving exclusion from a particular resource.
Let us start initially with a discussion of land as a resource system. Where population density is extremely low, land is abundant and land generates a rich diversity of plant and animal products without much husbandry, the expected costs of establishing and defending boundaries to a parcel of land of any size may be greater than the expected bene®ts of enclosure (Demsetz, 1967; Feeny, 1993) . Settlers moving into a new terrain characterized by high risk due to danger from others, from a harsh environment or from lack of appropriate knowledge may decide to develop one large, common parcel prior to any divisions into smaller parcels (Ellickson, 1993) . Once land becomes scarce, con¯ict over who has the rights to invest in improvements and reap the results of their efforts can lead individuals to want to enclose land through fencing or institutional means to protect their investments. Tradeoffs in costs need to be considered. The more land that is included within one enclosure, the lower the costs are of defending all the boundaries but the higher the costs are of regulating the use of the enclosed parcel.
The decision to enclose need not be taken in one step from an open-access terrain to a series of private plots owned exclusively by single families (Field, 1984 (Field, , 1985 (Field, , 1989 Ellickson, 1993) . The bene®ts of enclosing land depend on the scale of productive activity involved. For some agricultural activities, considerable bene®ts may be associated with smaller parcels fully owned by a family enterprise. For other activities, the bene®ts of household plots may not be substantial. Moving all the way to private plots is an ef®cient move when the expected marginal returns from enclosing numerous plots exceed the expected marginal costs of defending a much more extended system of boundaries and the reduced transaction costs of making decisions about use patterns (Nugent and Sanchez, 1995) .
In a classic study of the diversity of property-rights systems used for many centuries by Swiss peasants, Robert Netting (1976 Netting ( , 1981 observed that the same individuals fully divided their agricultural land into separate familyowned parcels but that grazing lands located on the Alpine hillsides were organized into communal property systems. In these mountain valleys, the same individuals used different property-rights systems side-by-side for multiple centuries. Each local community had considerable autonomy to change local rules, so there was no problem of someone else imposing an inef®cient set of rules on them. Netting argued that attributes of the resource affected which property-rights systems were most likely for diverse purposes. Netting identi®ed ®ve attributes that he considered to be most conducive to the development of communal property rights:
1. low value of production per unit of area, 2. high variance in the availability of resource units on any one parcel, 3. low returns from intensi®cation of investment, 4. substantial economies of scale by utilizing a large area and 5. substantial economies of scale in building infrastructures to utilize the large area.
Steep land where rainfall is scattered may not be suitable for most agricultural purposes but can be excellent land for pasture and forests if aggregated into suf®ciently large parcels. By developing communal property rights to large parcels of such land, those who are members of the community are able to share environmental risks due to the unpredictability of rain-induced growth of grasses within any smaller region. Further, herding and processing of milk products is subject to substantial economies of scale. If individual families develop means to share these reduced costs, all can save substantially. Building the appropriate roads, retaining walls and processing facilities may also be done more economically if these efforts are shared.
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While the Swiss peasants were able to devote these harsh lands to productive activities, they had to invest time and effort in the development of rules that would reduce the incentives to overgraze and would ensure that investments in shared infrastructure were maintained over time. In many Swiss villages, rights to common pasturage were distributed according to the number of cows that could be carried over the winter using hay supplies produced on the owners' private parcels. In all cases, the village determined who would be allowed to use, the speci®c access and withdrawal rights to be used, how investment and maintenance costs were to be shared and how the annual returns from common processing activities were to be shared. All of these systems included at least village proprietorship rights but some Swiss villages developed full ownership rights by incorporating and authorizing the buying and selling of shares (usually with the approval of the village). Netting's ®ndings are strongly supported by studies of mountain villages in Japan, where thousands of rural villages have held communal property rights to extensive forests and grazing areas located in the steep mountainous regions located above their private agricultural plots (McKean, 1982 (McKean, , 1992 . Similar systems have existed in Norway for centuries (O È rebech, 1993; Sandberg, 1993 Sandberg, , 2001 .
The importance of sharing risk is stressed in other theoretical and empirical studies of communal proprietorships (Nugent and Sanchez, 1993; Antilla and Torp, 1996; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002) . Unpredictability and risk are increased in systems where resource units are mobile and where storage facilities, such as dams, do not exist . Institutional facilities for sharing risk, such as formal insurance systems or institutionalized mechanisms for reciprocal obligations in times of plenty, also affect the kinds of property-rights systems that individuals can devise. When no physical or institutional mechanisms exist for sharing risk, communal property arrangements may enable individuals to adopt productive activities not feasible under individual property rights. Empirical studies have shown that the variance in the productivity of land over space ± due largely to the variance in rainfall from year to year ± is strongly associated with the size of communally held parcels allocated to grazing in the Sudan (Nugent and Sanchez, 1995) . Ellickson (1993) compares the types of environmental and personal security risks faced by new settlers in New England, in Bermuda and in Utah to explain the variance in the speed of converting jointly held land to individually held land in each of these settlements.
A consistent ®nding across many studies of communal property-rights systems is that these systems do not exist in isolation and are usually used in conjunction with individual ownership. In most irrigation systems that are built and managed by the farmers themselves, for example, each farmer owns his or her own plot(s) while participating as a joint proprietor or owner in a communally organized irrigation system (Coward, 1980; Sengupta, 1991 Sengupta, , 1993 Tang, 1992; Wade, 1992; Vincent, 1995) . Water is allocated to individual participants using a variety of individually tailored rules but those irrigation systems that have survived for long periods of time tend to allocate water and responsibilities for joint costs using a similar metric ± frequently the amount of land owned by a farmer (Ostrom, 1990 (Ostrom, , 1992 . In other words, bene®ts are roughly proportional to the costs of investing and maintaining the system itself.
Further, formally recognized communal systems are usually nested into a series of governance units that complement the organizational skills and knowledge of those involved in making collective-choice decisions in smaller units (Johnson, 1972) . Since the Middle Ages, most of the Alpine systems in both Switzerland and Italy have been nested in a series of self-governing communities that respectively governed villages, valleys and federations of valleys (Merlo, 1989) . In modern times, cantonal authorities in Switzerland have assumed an added responsibility to make periodic, careful monitoring visits to each alp on a rotating basis and to provide professional assessments and recommendations to local villages, thereby greatly enhancing the quality of knowledge and information about the sustainability of these resources (Glaser, 1987) .
Contrary to the expectation that communal property systems lacking the right to alienate ownership shares are markedly less ef®cient than propertyrights systems involving full ownership, substantial evidence exists that many communal proprietorships effectively solve a wide diversity of local problems with relatively low transaction costs (Gaffney, 1992; Sandberg, 1993 Sandberg, , 1996a Hanna and Munasinghe, 1995a,b; Wilson, 1995; Kaul, 1996) . Obtaining valid and reliable measures of outputs and costs for a large number of property-rights systems covering similar activities in matched environmental settings is extremely dif®cult (see discussion in Gibson et al., 2000) . In regard to irrigation, a series of careful studies of the performance of communal proprietorship systems as contrasted to governmentowned and managed systems, clearly demonstrates the higher productivity of the communal systems controlling for relevant variables (Tang, 1992; Benjamin et al., 1994; Ostrom, 1996; Lam, 1998 ). Schlager's (1994) studies of inshore ®sheries demonstrate that ®shers who have clearly de®ned proprietorship are able to solve dif®cult assignment problems and assign the use of space and technology so as to increase both the ef®ciency and equity of their systems. Wilson's (1995) studies also demonstrate that communal proprietorship systems are more ef®cient than frequently thought.
Performance of communal property-rights systems varies substantially, however, as does the performance of all property-rights systems. Some communal systems fail or limp along at the margin of effectiveness just as private ®rms fail or barely hang on to pro®tability over long periods of time. National governments and international donors have devoted considerable 256 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15(3) funds to encourage decentralized efforts with varying degrees of success (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001 ). In addition to the environmental variables discussed earlier that are conducive in the ®rst place to the use of communal proprietorship or ownership, the following variables related to the attributes of participants are conducive to their selection of norms, rules and property rights that enhance the performance of communal property-rights systems:
1. Accurate information about the condition of the resource and expected ow of bene®ts and costs are available at low cost to the participants (Gilles and Jamtgaard, 1981; Blomquist, 1992) . 2. Participants share a common understanding about the potential bene®ts and risks associated with the continuance of the status quo as contrasted with changes in norms and rules that they could feasibly adopt (Ostrom, 1990; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996) . 3. Participants share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital (Cordell and McKean, 1992; Anderson et al., 2003) . 4. The group using the resource is relatively stable (Seabright, 1993) . 5. Participants plan to live and work in the same area for a long time (and in some cases, expect their offspring to live there as well) and, thus, do not heavily discount the future (Grima and Berkes, 1989 ). 6. Participants use collective-choice rules that fall between the extremes of unanimity or control by a few (or even bare majority) and, thus, avoid high transaction or high deprivation costs (Ostrom, 1990 ). 7. Participants can develop relatively accurate and low-cost monitoring and sanctioning arrangements (Berkes, 1992) .
Many of these variables are, in turn, affected by the type of larger regime in which users are embedded. If the larger regime recognizes the legitimacy of communal systems and is facilitative of local self-organization by providing accurate information about natural resource systems, providing arenas in which participants can engage in discovery and con¯ict-resolution processes, and providing mechanisms to back up local monitoring and sanctioning efforts, the probability of participants adapting more effective rules over time is higher than in regimes that ignore resource problems or presume that all decisions about governance and management need to be made by central authorities.
Two additional variables ± the size of a group and its homogeneity ± have been noted as conducive to the initial organization of communal resources and to their successful performance over time (Libecap, 1989a,b; Kanbur, 1991; Ostrom, 1992) . As more research has been conducted, however, it is obvious that much more theoretical and empirical work is needed since OSTROM: TYPES OF GOODS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 257 both variables appear to have complex effects. Changing the size of a group, for example, always involves changing some of the other variables likely to affect the performance of a system. Increasing the size of a group is likely to be associated with at least the following changes: (1) an increase in the transaction costs of reaching agreements; (2) a reduction of the burden borne by each participant for meeting joint costs such as guarding a system and maintenance; and (3) an increase in the amount of assets held by the group that could be used in times of emergency (Cornes et al., 1986) . Libecap (1995) found that it was particularly hard to get agreements to oil unitization with groups greater than four. Blomquist (1992) , in contrast, documents processes conducted in the shadow of an equity court that involved up to 750 participants in agreeing to common rules to allocate rights to withdraw water from groundwater basins in southern California. The processes took a relatively long period of time but they have now also survived with little administrative costs for half a century. Agrawal (2000) has shown that communal forestry institutions in India that are moderate in size are more likely to reduce overharvesting than are smaller groups because they tend to utilize a higher level of guarding than smaller groups. Group heterogeneity is also multifaceted in its basic causal processes and effects (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002) . Groups can differ along many dimensions including their assets, their information, their valuation of ®nal products, their production technologies, their time horizons, their exposure to risk (e.g. headenders versus tailenders on irrigation systems) as well as their cultural belief systems (Keohane and Ostrom, 1995; Schlager and Blomquist, 1998 ). Libecap's (1989b) research on inshore ®sheries has shown that when ®shers have distinctively different production technologies and skills, all potential rules for sharing withdrawal rights have substantial distributional consequences and are the source of con¯ict that may not easily be overcome. Libecap and Wiggins's (1984) studies of the pro-rationing of crude oil production reveal an interesting relationship between the levels and type of information available to participants and the likelihood of agreement at various stages in a bargaining process. In the early stages of negotiation, all oil producers share a relatively equal level of ignorance about the relative claims that each might be able to make under private-property arrangements. This is the most likely time for oil unitization agreements to be reached successfully. If agreement is not reached early, each participant gains asymmetric information about their own claims as more and more investments are made in private information. Agreements are unlikely at this stage. If producers then aggressively pump from a common oil pool, all tend to be harmed by the overproduction and are willing late in the process to recognize their joint interests. Libecap (1995) also shows a strong negative impact of heterogeneity in his study of marketing agreements among orange growers. The theoretical work of Mancur Olson 258 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15(3) (1965) on privileged groups, however, predicts that when some participants have substantial assets and those interests are aligned with achieving an agreement, such groups are more likely to be organized. The empirical support for this proposition comes more from studies of global commons (Mitchell, 1995; Oye and Maxwell, 1995) .
Attributes of Common-pool Resources Conducive to Use of Individual Property Rights
The advantage of individual ownership of strictly private goods ± where the cost of exclusion is relatively low and one person's consumption is subtractive from what is available to others ± is so well established that it does not merit attention here. Industrial and agricultural commodities clearly ®t the de®nition of private goods. Individual rights to exclusion and to transferring control over these goods generate incentives that lead to higher levels of productivity than other forms of property arrangements. It has frequently been assumed that land also is clearly always a private good and therefore best allocated using market mechanisms based on individual ownership rights. Agricultural land in densely settled regions is usually best allocated by a system of individual property rights. Gaining formal title to land, however, may or may not increase ef®ciency. Feder et al. (1988) conducted an important econometric study that showed that agricultural land in Thailand without a formal title was worth only one-half to two-thirds of land with a formal title. Further, increasing the security of private-property rights also led to an increased value of the crops produced (between one-tenth and one-fourth higher than those without secure title). More secure titling also provided better access to credit and led to greater investments in improved land productivity (see also Feder and Feeny, 1991) .
Title insurance is one mechanism used to reduce the risk of challenges to ownership of land. Registering brands is still another technique used to increase the security of ownership over resource units in the form of cattle that may range freely over a large area until there is a communal effort to undertake a round-up. Gaining formal titles is, however, costly. In societies that do not yet have high population densities and where customary rights are still commonly understood and accepted, formal titling may be an expensive method of increasing the security of a title that is not associated with a suf®ciently higher return to be worth the economic investment (see MigotAdholla et al., 1991) . In addition, it should now be clear that the cost of fencing land by physical and/or institutional means is non-trivial and that there are types of land and land uses that may be more ef®ciently governed by groups of individuals rather than single individuals.
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A commonly recommended solution to problems associated with the governance and management of mobile resources units, such as water and ®sh, is their`privatization' (Christy, 1973; Clark, 1980) . What private ownership usually means in regard to mobile resource units, however, is ownership of the rights to withdraw a quantity of a resource unit and the right to alienate this harvesting right. Water rights are normally associated with the allocation of a particular quantity of water per unit of time or the allocation of a right to take water for a particular period of time or at a particular location. Fishing rights are similarly associated with quantity, time or location. These rights are typically`withdrawal' rights that are tied to resource units and not to a resource system. In addition to the individual water rights that farmers hold in an irrigation system, they may also jointly own ± and, therefore, govern and manage ± the irrigation facilities themselves (Tang, 1992) . In addition to the quotas or`®shing units' that individual ®shers may own, no one owns the ®shing stock and governmental units may exercise various types of management rights in relationship to these stocks (Schlager, 1994) . In groundwater basins that have been successfully litigated, individual pumpers own a de®ned quantity of water that they can produce, rent or sell but the groundwater basins themselves may be managed by a combination of general-purpose and special-purpose governmental units and private associations (Blomquist, 1992) .
Implementing operational and ef®cient individual withdrawal rights to mobile resources is far more dif®cult in practice than demonstrating the economic ef®ciency of hypothetical systems (Yandle, 2001) . Simply gaining valid and accurate measurements of`sustainable yield' is a scienti®cally dif®cult task. In systems where resource units are stored naturally or by constructing facilities such as a dam, the availability of a de®ned quantity of the resource units can be ascertained with considerable accuracy, and buying, selling and leasing rights to known quantities is relatively easy to effectuate in practice. Many mobile resource systems do not have natural or constructed storage facilities and gaining accurate information about the stock and reproduction rates is costly and involves considerable uncertainty (Allen and McGlade, 1987; Wilson et al., 1991) . Further, as Copes (1986) has clearly articulated, appropriators from such resources can engage in a wide diversity of evasive strategies that can destabilize the efforts of government agencies trying to manage these systems. Once such systems have allocated individual withdrawal rights, efforts to further regulate patterns of withdrawal may be dif®cult and involve expensive buy-back schemes (O È rebech, 1982) . Experience with these individual withdrawal-rights systems has varied greatly in practice (see Pinkerton, 1992 Pinkerton, , 1994 McCay, 1992; McCay et al. 1996; Wilson and Dickie, 1995; Yandle and Dewees, 2003) . Further, ef®ciency is not the only criteria that should be taken into account 260 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 15(3) when analyzing the effect of privatizing essential goods, such as water (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1995) . Exactly which attributes of both physical and social systems are most important to the success of individual withdrawal rights from commonpool resources is not as well established as the attributes of common-pool resource systems conducive to group proprietorship or ownership. On the physical side, gaining accurate measurements of the key variables (quantity, space, technology) that are to be involved in management efforts is essential. Resource systems that are naturally well bounded facilitate measurement as well as ease of observing appropriation behavior. Storage also facilitates measurement. Where resource units move over vast terrain, the cost of measurement is higher than when they are contained (e.g. it is easier to develop effective withdrawal-rights systems for lobsters than for whales).
Considerable recent research has also stressed the importance of involving participants in the design and implementation of individual withdrawalrights systems (Yandle and Dewees, 2003) . When participants do not look upon such rules as legitimate, effective and fair, the capacity to invent evasive strategies is substantial (Seabright, 1993; Wilson, 1995) . The size of the group involved and the heterogeneity of participants also affect the costs of maintaining withdrawal-rights systems (Edwards, 1994) . And, the very process of allocating quantitative and transferable rights to resource units may undo some of the common understandings and norms that allowed communal ownership systems to operate at lower day-to-day administrative costs.
Conclusion
Mancur Olson opened a vast territory for social scientists interested in the development of coherent bodies of theory that can be tested and improved by empirical research. Olson envisioned a general theory that would encompass ®ndings for the entire territory of collective action. The territory turned out to be too vast and too heterogeneous for one general theory. This has not been a detriment, however, to further theoretical development and empirical testing except for those who eschew all complexity in social science theories.
Olson chose wisely when he stressed exclusion as the ®rst theoretical attribute to consider. Whether it is costly or not to exclude bene®ciaries from consuming a good, once it is provided, is indeed the most important theoretical distinction to be made among goods. It separates those where temptations to free ride exist and goods where individuals cannot free ride and still bene®t. A second distinction ± whether consumption of units by one person subtracts from the availability of bene®ts to others ± is needed OSTROM: TYPES OF GOODS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 261 to separate public-good problems from common-pool resource problems. High levels of use of a common-pool resource can lead to its congestion, degradation and potentially to its destruction. High levels of consumption of a public good, such as knowledge or national defense, do not have the same adverse consequences. Given the dramatically opposite behavior and outcomes that occur in these two broad situations, this fundamental distinction among collective action problems must be made in efforts to provide a theoretical explanation. The task of elucidating the theoretical family tree of collective action theories only starts with the distinction between public goods and commonpool resources. Next, one needs to examine how production and allocation formulae change the structure of incentives facing participants in these situations. Findings from experimental research support the overall argument that diverse production and allocation formulae strongly in¯uence the behavior of participants and the outcomes achieved.
Another realm of theoretical development needed by scholars who want to understand and explain outcomes in collective action situations is the structure of property-right-regimes. Instead of distinguishing between`well de®ned property rights' based only on whether users possess the right to alienate their ownership claims, ®ve distinct basic bundles of rights are usefully distinguished. Any of the ®ve may or may not be well de®ned. Incentives differ according to which combination of rights are possessed. Many existing regimes have managed resources sustainably for long periods of time without individuals possessing the rights of alienation. Instead, empirical studies show that groups of individuals who possess at least the rights of proprietorship are able to govern and manage their systems more effectively than presumed in the earlier theoretical literature.
Finally, attributes of common-pool resources conducive to common property and to individual private-property regimes are presented based on extensive ®eld research and recent efforts to provide a theoretical synthesis. Instead of a general conclusion that one kind of property regime is best for all types of common-pool resources, a diversity of attributes affects the incentives of participants and the resulting performance.
Consequently, the resulting family of collective action theories has to include the rich interplay between the nature of the good, the propertyright-regimes in place, the governance system used for making new rules and the resulting payoff structure. All of these attributes must be taken into account to generate empirically warrantable results. Olson's original formulation turns out to be one of the relevant special theories of this larger family of theories: a long-lasting and important contribution to the analysis of collective action problems.
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